From:          "Yeshivat Har Etzion's Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash"
To:            yhe-intparsha@vbm-torah.org
Subject:       INTPARSHA -18: Parashat Mishpatim


                    
                     Yeshivat Har Etzion
           Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash
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              Introduction to Parashat HaShavua
                             
                             
          Parashat Mishpatim - 'An Eye for an Eye'
                      By Michael Hattin


Introduction

     The   Ramban  (13th  century,  Spain)   introduces   his
commentary  to  the Parasha of Mishpatim with the  following
synopsis:   "And  these are the laws which you  shall  place
before  them" - "the Divine intent was to present the people
with  these laws immediately after the Revelation at  Sinai.
Recall  that  the  first  of  the Ten  Utterances   concerned
recognition  of  God  and  the second  prohibited  idolatry.
After  that theophany had taken place, God reiterated  these
ideas:  'you yourselves saw that I spoke to you from heaven'
(Shemot  20:19) parallels the First Utterance of 'I  am  the
Lord.'   'You  shall  not fashion gods of  silver  or   gold'
(Shemot  20:20) recalls the Second Utterance that prohibited
idolatry.  These laws about to now be presented continue the
theme  of  'Thou  shall not covet.'   For  if  a   person  is
ignorant  concerning the laws of the house,  the  field,  or
other  forms  of property, he might imagine to himself  that
they   are  his,  and  then  covet  them  and   seize   them.
Therefore,  God commanded Moshe to place these  laws  before
the  people,  so that they will behave with uprightness  and
not desire that which does not belong to them.  Similarly in
the  Midsrash  Rabba  it is stated:  'The  entire  Torah   is
predicated  on  justice, and therefore God  presented  these
laws  after  the  Revelation of the Ten Utterances.'   Thus,
these laws that follow speak of the prohibition of idolatry,
of  the  obligation  to  honor one's  parents,  and  of   the
prohibition  of  murder  and  adultery,  all  of  which   are
mentioned in the Ten Utterances."

     Laws  form the foundation of every functioning society.
The  rule  of  law  ensures  that individuals  respect   each
other's person and property, and behave responsibly when  in
a social context.  When mishap or damage does occur, whether
by  premeditation, foreseeable negligence, or accident, laws
regulate  restitution and impose punishment as  appropriate.
The  Ten  Utterances are universally regarded as fundamental
principles  and  yet,  the  Ramban  informs  us,  they    are
insufficient in and of themselves to create a moral and law-
abiding  society.  "Thou shall not covet" is an upright  and
virtuous  injunction,  a majestic vision  expressed  with  a
remarkable economy of words, but in the absence of practical
and  detailed  guidelines that spell out its parameters,  it
remains  an  exalted slogan with little hope of realization.
Thus,  fast  on  the  heels of the  Ten  Guiding   Principles
presented in last week's Parasha, the Torah presents the Law
Code  of Parashat Mishpatim, a series of statutes that forms
its natural continuation.


Civil Law and Ritual Observance

     Considering  the  Ten  Utterances  or   the  Parasha  of
Mishpatim, we at once notice a feature common to  both  that
is  striking as well as unique.  Civil law on the one  hand,
and ritual law or exhortation to religious excellence on the
other,   are   presented  not  as  disparate  and    discrete
disciplines but as organically related parts of  a  complete
system.   Thus, in the case of the Ten Utterances,  laws  of
idolatry or Sabbath observance are juxtaposed with  laws  of
murder   or  theft.   In  the  much  lengthier   Parasha   of
Mishpatim, laws of slavery, torts or loans are presented  in
proximity  to  laws  of  forbidden  foods,  sacrifices,    or
holidays.  This type of commingling is unparalleled  in  any
other 'code' of law that has come down to us from antiquity.
All  of  the ancient Near-Eastern compilations of  law,  for
example,  treat  civil law and ritual law as two  completely
distinct   frameworks  that  are  invariably  presented    as
independent literary works.

     The  implication  of  this fact is staggering,   for  it
suggests  that  the  ultimate motive for the  observance  of
rational  and reasonable civil laws is synonymous  with  the
driving  force  that enjoins observance of  the  ritual  and
religious injunctions: the authority of a Transcendent  God.
There  is  therefore  no intrinsic difference  between  both
realms  for  they  are complementary halves  of  a  complete
whole.   The desire to bifurcate social law from ritual,  to
swear  allegiance to a 'Prophetic Judaism' while denigrating
or  downgrading ritual observance, is founded upon a  faulty
premise  that  paradoxically is apt to remove God  from  the
equation.

     We  tend  to  accept  civil law as  more   valuable  and
meaningful  because it makes sense.  Ritual,  on  the  other
hand, often defies easy and straightforward rational enquiry
and   therefore   we   discard   it    with   greater   ease.
Fundamentally,  however,  the  structure  of   our    Parasha
demonstrates that the legitimacy of both is predicated  upon
the  very  same  premise.  The religious core that  animates
sincere  ritual observance also constitutes the soul  of  an
impassioned  crusade  for  social justice.   Conversely,  if
social  laws  are  meaningful only because  their  value  is
rational  and obvious and not because they are the  commands
of  an  absolute  Deity, then such laws  can  never  be   the
vehicles  for  the  spiritual transformation  of  the  human
being.   Put differently, the same Hebrew prophets who  were
filled with burning indignation for the plight of the widow,
orphan and stranger, also inveighed against idolatry and the
desecration of the Shabbat.  The ideal student of the  Torah
is  therefore meticulous in his/her relationship with  other
people and their property, as well as being scrupulous  with
respect to the ritual laws.


The Literal Reading

     Let  us  keep this critical binary relationship between
civil law and ritual observance in mind as we examine one of
the  most  misunderstood and maligned laws of this  Parasha.
A literal and superficial reading of its contents has served
as  a pretext to accuse the Torah of primitive vengefulness,
and the God of the Hebrews of vindictiveness.  The issue  of
which  we  speak is presented in a section that relates  the
case  of  injury inflicted upon an innocent bystander  to  a
violent dispute:  "If two men strive together, and strike  a
pregnant  women who consequently miscarries,  but  no  other
tragedy  ensues, then they shall be fined according  to  the
claim  filed  by the husband in court.  But  if  her  tragic
death follows, then you shall give one life for another.  An
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand and a
foot  for  a foot.  A burn for a burn, a wound for a  wound,
and a bruise for a bruise."

     This  passage  presents many difficulties of   exegesis,
but  the  most  glaring  one  concerns  the  apparent   legal
sanction  if  not  outright support for the  so-called  'lex
talionis'  or law of retaliation.  That is, taken literally,
the  verses seem to indicate that if one inflicts an  injury
upon  another, the Torah mandates that a similar  injury  be
inflicted  upon  the perpetrator.  This  form  of  'justice'
strikes us as barbaric and primitive, appealing to the baser
passions  of the victim and society, rather than  attempting
to inculcate a higher degree of civilized behavior.


The Traditional Reading - The Rational Argument

     It  is  essential  to bear in mind that  the   unanimous
consensus of the early sources such as the Mishna, Midrashei
Halakha,   and  Talmud,  as  well  as  that  of   the   later
commentaries, is that the passage in question is not  to  be
understood  literally.   There is not  a  single  source   or
opinion to be found in the vast corpus of traditional Jewish
writings, early or late, halakhic or homiletic, that  argues
for  a  literal  application  of  the  principle.    For  the
purposes  of simplicity, we shall quote at length  from  the
words  of Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra (12th century, Spain),  but
much  of  his  evidence is in fact based  upon  the  earlier
sources.  In general, it may be said that the rejection of a
literal  interpretation  is  predicated  upon  rational  and
ethical   considerations,  but  can  also  be    convincingly
supported  by recourse to textual analysis and investigation
of parallel sources.

     Ibn Ezra writes:

     "'An  eye  for  an eye' - Rabbi Saadiah (10th   century,
     Babylon)  explained that we cannot explain  this   verse
     literally,  for if a man struck the eye of  his   fellow
     and  caused a vision loss equal to 1/3, how will it  be
     possible  to inflict precisely the same injury  on   the
     perpetrator,  witneither excess  nor  deficiency?    The
     wound  and  the  bruise present an even more   difficult
     situation,  for  if  the initial injury  was   sustained
     close  to a vital organ, perhaps the retaliatory strike
     will  result  in the death of the perpetrator.    Reason
     does  not  tolerate  a literal interpretation   of  this
     verse!"

     Here,  Ibn Ezra maintains that reason argues against  a
literal  understanding because it is not possible  to  apply
the principle of retaliation with precision.  This point  is
particularly  cogent if we bear in mind that the  underlying
justification  for  retaliation in kind is  the  concept  of
equivalence.   In other words, if the victim  of  an  attack
sustained  an  injury, it is only right that  the  aggressor
should suffer the same injury.  This represents a rough  but
satisfying  form of frontier justice in which the  assailant
gets his just desserts.  But, says Ibn Ezra, the very desire
to  impose equality before the law that serves as the  basic
justification for 'an eye for an eye' contests  the  literal
interpretation,  for the exact same injury  cannot,  in  all
probability, be inflicted upon the perpetrator.


The Traditional Reading - The Textual Argument

     The  troublesome phrase in question is of  course   "and
you shall give a soul for a soul.  An eye for an eye..."  In
the original Hebrew, the words read: "VeNatata nefesh tachat
nafesh.   Ayin  tachat  ayin..."  What  is  the   meaning  of
'tachat'?   Often,  this word carries a spatial  connotation
and  means  'under,' but here and in many other contexts  it
implies  'in  place  of.'  Thus, we are  told  that   Avraham
offered  a  ram 'tachat' his son Yitzchak (Bereishit  22:13)
which  is  to say 'in place of,' or that Yaacov rebukes  his
wife  Rachel by exclaiming "am I then 'tachat' God  who  has
withheld  offspring from you?" (Bereishit 30:2).   Rendering
the  phrase  as 'a soul in place of a soul, and  an  eye  in
place of an eye' does not appear to obviate the difficulty.

     An investigation of the parallel passage in the Book of
VaYikra  in Parashat Emor, however, begins to shed light  on
the  textual  aspect of the issue:  "A man who  strikes  and
kills  his  fellow shall surely be put to  death.   One  who
strikes   and   kills   an   animal    shall   make   payment
('yeshalmenah'), a soul for a soul.  A man  who  inflicts  a
disfigurement on his fellow, as he did so shall it  be  done
to him.  A break for a break, an eye for an eye, a tooth for
a  tooth, as a man inflicts a disfigurement on his fellow so
shall  it  be given upon him.  One who strikes and kills  an
animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes and kills a man
shall   die..."   (VaYikra  24:17-23).   The    verses   here
emphatically  contrast the case of killing a  man  with  the
case   of  killing  an  animal.   For  the   former,  capital
punishment is enjoined, while for the latter, payment can be
made.   In  language which echoes that of our  Parasha,  the
Torah  again appears to mandate retaliation for  the  bodily
injury  of another person.  We are once more left to  ponder
the  significance of 'an eye for an eye, and a tooth  for  a
tooth.'

     This  time,  however, the text of the Torah   interprets
itself:  "One  who  strikes and kills an animal  shall  make
payment, a soul for a soul."  The indication clearly is that
one  who kills his fellow's animal must pay for it and  make
restitution, for the verb 'yeshalmenah' comes from the  root
'ShaLeM'   meaning  'complete'  or  'whole,'  and   therefore
'restitution'  or  'payment' that can  replace  a  loss  and
thereby  restore  the victim to a complete  state.  Yet  the
Torah  unambiguously describes this arrangement as  'a  soul
for  (in  place of) a soul'!  In other words, the  means  of
compensating the injured party for loss of his killed animal
is not by killing the animal of the aggressor, but rather by
necessitating that aggressor to make payment.  Nevertheless,
the  Torah  calls this monetary settlement  'a  soul  for  a
soul.'

     At  first  glance,  adopting such a reading   also  with
respect  to  injury  of another human being  appears  to  be
necessarily  contradicted  by  the  expression  "a  man   who
inflicts  a disfigurement on his fellow, as he did (ka'asher
asah)  so  shall  it  be  done to him  (kain  yaiaseh   lo)."
Shimshon's use of the same idiom to describe his response to
Philistine  aggression, however, demonstrates that  it  need
not  imply  exact, equivalent reciprocity of injury.   After
the  Philistines had burned his Timnite wife and  father-in-
law,  Shimshon  strikes back and kills many  of  them.   The
tribesmen of Yehuda among whom he seeks refuge are reluctant
to  shelter  him, for they fear the vengeance of the  ruling
Philistines.  "You are fully aware that the Philistines rule
over  us,"  they  exclaim,  "what  have  you   done  to  us?"
Shimshon  responds: "As they have done to me  (ka'asher  asu
li),  so have I done to them (Kain asiti lahem)!"  (See  The
Book of Shoftim/Judges Chapter 14-15).  Now surely, Shimshon
did  not  mean to imply that he had inflicted the very  same
bodily  injuries on the Philistines that they  had  done  to
him, for they had burned his wife and father-in-law and  his
response was warfare.  Rather, what he meant was that he had
'repaid'  them in kind for their act of cruelty  by  besting
them in battle.  In other words, the expression employed  in
the  passage  from Parashat Emor can also be taken  to  mean
'repayment  or compensation' and not 'equivalent retaliatory
injury.'


Reconciling   the  Literal  Reading  with  the    Traditional
Interpretation

     We  are now able to provide a plausible explanation for
this  difficult expression.  The Torah could  very  well  be
interpreted  to mean that when a person strikes and  injures
the  eye  or tooth of his fellow, the appropriate  and  just
judicial response is the imposition of a monetary forfeiture
on  the  aggressor  in accordance with the  'value'  of  the
injured organ or limb.  This, in fact, is the position  that
is  maintained  by the traditional sources themselves.   Ibn
Ezra,  though, remains skeptical of the rational and textual
arguments,  for  in  the  end  he  concludes:   "The  general
operative  principle  is that we are not  able  to  offer  a
complete  explanation  for  the commandments  of  the  Torah
without  recourse to the Oral Tradition transmitted  by  our
Sages.   Just  as  we received the Written  Torah  from   our
ancestors, so have we received the Oral Tradition, and  both
are   equally  authoritative."   Thus,  although   a  literal
reading  of 'an eye for an eye' is not absolutely  refutable
on  rational  or  textual grounds,  it  is  negated  by   the
existence of an authentic oral tradition to the contrary.

     We are thus left in the somewhat uncomfortable position
of  possessing a text which seems to indicate  one  thing  -
retaliation,  and  a  tradition that insists  on  another  -
monetary   compensation.   Or,  to  phrase   the    conundrum
differently, if the Torah really meant to teach us  monetary
compensation, then why did it employ in its written form  an
expression     which    could    easily     be     understood
(misinterpreted?) to mean bodily retaliation?  Here, the Ibn
Ezra  provides  an answer that captures the essence  of  the
Torah's  more profound message: "The expression 'an eye  for
an  eye' means that it would be fitting for the aggressor to
forfeit  his  own eye, if he refuses to provide 'ransom'  in
the form of monetary compensation."  What is the meaning  of
his words?

     Sometimes we fall into the trap of believing that money
can  solve  all of life's ills.  If an object breaks,  money
can  replace it.  If a body ails, money can heal it.   If  a
soul  languishes, money can comfort it.  Human  productivity
is   measured  by  economic  output,  human  creativity    by
potential  market  value, human success by  monetary  worth.
These deep-seated but skewed values are not an invention  of
the  modern  age but have been part of the social  landscape
since  the concept of capital first seized hold of the human
psyche.   The  danger that such attitudes engender  is  that
they  can lead to the commercialization of the human  being,
and  his  transformation  from a Divinely  fashioned  unique
personality into a mass-produced standard good or service.

     To  express  the  problem  in  the   terms  of  Parashat
Mishpatim,  we may come to believe that when  an  injury  is
inflicted  on another person's property or body,  money  can
heal  the  wound, assuage the pain, erase the  anguish,  and
compensate  for  the damage.  adoption of such  an  attitude
would be to read 'an eye for an eye' as implying exclusively
monetary  compensation.  Now it may indeed be the case  that
financial restitution is to be preferred to retaliation, and
that surely needs no rational explanation.  At the same time
however,  we  must understand that monetary compensation  is
perhaps  the  best  solution,  but  that  in  the    end   no
replacement  can  ever  be made for  the  injury  inflicted,
particularly  if loss of a limb or organ is  involved.   The
explanation  provided by the Oral Tradition makes  it  clear
that  payment  for  damage may absolve one  of  secular  and
social culpability.  The Written Torah, however, couches the
concept of monetary compensation in terms of 'an eye for  an
eye.'  This striking phrase is to indicate that in the  much
more  exalted  moral and ethical dimension, the  perpetrator
must  feel  for the injured party as if they had to  forfeit
their  own eye, as if financial restitution was an imperfect
and  incomplete  form of ransom for their crime,  as  if  no
amount  of money could ever replace what was lost, for  that
is indeed the case.

Shabbat Shalom

     For  further study: see the Ibn Ezra's introduction  to
the  Torah  where he develops at length the concept  of  the
necessity of relying upon an Oral Tradition to explicate the
written text of the Torah.  Something as fundamental as  the
principals  of the Hebrew calendar, essential for regulating
the   life  of  the  Jewish  nation  and  for   allowing  the
celebration of the days enjoined by Scriptural Law,  is  not
spelled out by the Written Torah in any way which makes  its
practical  formulation  possible.  This  example,  and  many
others like it, indicates that the existence of an authentic
and accurate Oral Tradition is not only an article of faith,
but also a rational imperative.

     See  also  the  Rambam  (12th century,   Egypt)  in  his
introduction  to the Mishna, where he indicates  that  there
has  never been a divergent tradition that has read 'an  eye
for  an  eye'  literally.  This makes the  traditional  Oral
interpretation as unassailable as the 'use of the  Etrog  on
the  Festival of Succot, for since the days of Yehoshua  bin
Nun  until  now, we have not seen a single Jewish  community
interpret 'the fruit of a beautiful tree' (VaYikra 23:40) as
indicating any other species!"  See also the Rambam  in  his
Mishneh Torah, Laws of Chovel U'Mazik Chapter 1:1-6 where he
states the matter in similar terms.

     I  have  avoided translating 'Aseret HaDibrot'  as   the
'Ten  Commandments'  and  have  instead  employed  the   'Ten
Utterances,' which is more accurate linguistically  as  well
as  thematically.   The Torah nowhere refers  to  these  ten
things  as  'Aseret HaMitzvot.'  Jewish tradition  early  on
recognized   the   danger  of  employing   the    term   'Ten
Commandments' to describe these principles, since  this  has
the inevitable effect of de-emphasizing the significance  of
the other mitzvot.  See the Talmud in Tractate Berakhot that
discusses  the  decision to exclude the  recitation  of  the
'Aseret  HaDibrot'  from  the  daily  liturgy,  for   similar
reasons.


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